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Introduction 
 
Recently there has been growing evidence of the re-location of production 
from western to eastern Europe, across a range of sectors and for a variety of 
reasons. This raises important questions as to how best to conceptualise the 
processes re-shaping economic  geographies within Europe. It also raises 
pressing practical and political issues and about their implications for territorial 
inequalities and uneven development in Europe. For two decades there was 
some evidence of slow convergence in regional economic performance 
(Canaleta et al, 2002); but in last decade or so this would seem to have been 
reversed as processes of European Union (EU) enlargement and deepening 
integration have accelerated. These gaps will further widen with the future as 
the eastward expansion of the EU (CEC, 2001). The evolving geographies of 
Europe’s economies have altered in response to this new map of 
opportunities and threats. 
 
The argument I advance here is that these changing geographies are a 
product of the inter-play of (inter-alia) corporate, state and trades union 
strategies, as companies pursue profitability, trades unions and workers seek 
new employment and/or protect existing jobs, and states attempt to balance 
the pursuit of accumulation in their territory with the claims of equity and 
socio-spatial justice. Geographies of economies are seen as contingent 
outcomes of the co-evolution of the asymmetric power relationships between 
these individual and collective actors and institutions. Conceptually, this 
represents an attempt to combine aspects of political economy and 
institutional approaches to facilitate understanding of the evolution of 
economies and their geographies, and recognise the variety of ways in which 
agency and action and the structural determinants of capitalist economies co-
evolve in particular ways1. However, the context in which these processes of 
co-evolution occur is important – one of political-economic processes of 
Europeanisation and globalisation – for these are both a partial product of the 
strategies of companies, states and trades unions and in turn help set the 
parameters which shape these processes.  
 
The on-going evolution of the EU is of particular relevance here. The 
expansion of the EU and, even more so, the collapse of state socialism, have 
been critical in re-defining the spaces open to companies in Europe.  The 
enlargements into southern Europe in the 1980s, the incorporation of the 
GDR following German re-unification, and the expansions of the 1990s to take 
in Austria, Finland and Sweden have all dramatically enlarged the extent of 
the EU’s territory. The forthcoming incorporation of states in CEE as they 
meet the economic and political criteria taken as indicative of their transition to 
capitalist economies and liberal democratic polities will further expand the EU, 
In practice pre-accession trade and aid arrangements are already closely 
inter-twining the economies of the applicants (especially the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, the most likely initial entrants) with those of the EU. The 
Single European Market programme and the creation of the Euro currency 
represent the latest stages in an on-going process of deepening economic – 
                                                          
1 For a fuller elaboration of this position, see Hudson, 2001. 
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and increasingly political –integration. Together these processes of deepening 
and widening constitute the formative moments in this process of re-drawing 
the map of Europe. This re-definition of the European space is in turn one 
moment in broader global processes, as new forms of capitalist uneven 
development emerge and evolve.  
 
The production, appropriation and realisation of surplus-value and associated 
value flows and the governance and regulatory processes that make them 
possible are fundamental to understanding the (re)configuration of economic 
activity and the meaning of regional development. As Hadjimichalis (1987) 
emphasises, transfers of value are inherently geographical.  Consequently, 
these changes offer new opportunities to both companies and regions, but 
they also pose potential threats to both. In particular, companies may fail if 
they are unable to come to terms with the new competitive terrain while 
regions may be endangered if they are unable to secure and hold down a 
place in circuits of value creation, circulation and appropriation. Consequently, 
it is necessary to understand the bases of the co-evolution and 
(in)compatibility of corporate and regional development interests 
 
 
Conceptualising changing geographies of economies in the 
EU: the social construction of production systems 
 
Corporate competitive strategies encompass a variety of practices and 
approaches, which can usefully be summarised in terms of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
competition. ‘Weak’ competition revolves around securing competitive 
advantage within a given technical-organisation paradigm of production by 
seeking cheaper sources of inputs to production than are available to 
competitors – for example of raw material or labour. ‘Strong’ (or 
Schumpeterian) competition involves seeking to gain advantage by re-
defining production paradigms via a variety of innovations  (product, process, 
organisational, with these often inter-linked). In addition, in both forms of 
competition, firms may collaborate via a variety of ‘networking’ strategies, 
involving sub-contracting and out-sourcing of a production of components and 
services.  Strategic alliances, acquisitions and mergers represent other 
longer-term options, which may be used in pursuit of either ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ 
competition. But the key point is that these are analytic distinctions. Firms 
pursue these analytically distinct strategies simultaneously.  
 
Moreover, firms characteristically co-operate in various way with other firms. 
Recognition that production involves inter-firm co-operation highlights the 
necessity to conceptualise production as a system organised across as well 
as within firm boundaries2. A production system may be defined as a 
distinctive form of organisation of production with corresponding technical 
(intra-firm) and social (inter-firm and sector) divisions of labour and modes of 
regulation, each with their own geographies, thereby emphasising the ways in 
                                                          
2 Production systems therefore involve conceptualising the economy as constituted through 
complex and recursive flows rather than in terms of linear flows - for example, in terms of 
production filières, commodity chains or value chains. 
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which production is embedded in particular socio-spatial settings (Dicken et 
al. 1995). To variable extents, the strategies that individual firms can pursue 
are constrained by sectoral governance arrangements. Within these 
constraints, firms have different degrees of power and influence, with 
important implications for geographies of production and the economic 
success of firms. Some forms of networked relationships involve relatively 
egalitarian ‘horizontal’ inter-firm relations – most notably in the arch-typical 
industrial districts of central and north east Italy. More generally, however, 
there are complex, variable and asymmetric geometries of power and 
influence that link firms into production systems. While some ‘lead’ firms 
exercise considerable power and influence and have a choice of ‘strong’ or 
‘weak’ competitive strategies, others in subordinate positions are typically 
constrained to pursue strategies of ‘weak’ competition. Moreover, depending 
upon the character of the product, the location of ’lead’ firms within the 
structure of the production system can differ markedly3. The locations of these 
firms, and decisions as to the location of different stages of production within 
and between firms (that is, the spatial distribution of the technical and social 
divisions of labour), has important ramifications for geographies of value 
production, transfer and appropriation and for the developmental possibilities 
and trajectories of different places. 
 
As well as companies, workers and trades unions seek to influence the 
location of economic activities (Herod, 2001).  Although in a structurally weak 
position relative to capital, unions can nonetheless, in specific circumstances, 
influence corporate (dis)investment strategies and geographies of production. 
However, trades unions occupy ambiguous position in seeking to influence 
economic geographies. While uniting fractions of the working class, trades 
unions at the same time divide that class – for example, by industry, 
occupation, gender and territory (Hudson, 2001, 217-54). Because of this, 
trades unions have become involved in inter-territorial competitions for 
employment and investment, sometimes in collaboration with companies 
whose interests are tied to particular places (Beynon and Hudson, 1993; 
Hudson, 2000, 201-26). In some circumstances social and environmental 
groups constituted in civil society  also seek to influence the geography of 
production systems, usually by developing countervailing sources of power to 
contest corporate decisions.  
 
To variable extents, the strategies of individual firms, trades unions and other 
social groups are constrained by modes of supra-national and national state 
regulation. There are three main ways in which states become involved with 
                                                          
3 Perhaps the best known stylised recognition of this is Gereffi’s (1994) distinction between 
‘buyer-driven’ and ‘producer driven’ commodity chains – with the former characterising 
consumer goods sectors (such as clothing) requiring relatively simple, typically labour-
intensive, manufacturing processes in which the dominant actors are major retailing chains, 
the latter characterising more complex consumer goods (such as cars), capital goods (for 
instance, aircraft), or basic manufactured materials (such as steel), which require capital-
intensive and technically sophisticated high-volume manufacturing and in which the ‘lead’ 
firms are core manufacturing companies that produce the final product. While this 
dichotomisation is too simplistic, not allowing for more complex power geometries of 
governance, it nonetheless is useful in drawing attention to differences between firms and 
industries.   
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regulation of the economy4. Firstly, they define the rules and laws that define 
acceptable conduct in market transactions. Secondly, they seek directly to 
influence the actions of others in markets– for example, via financial 
incentives that attempt to influence the location of private sector investments 
and decisions as to currency exchange rates. Thirdly, they may replace the 
private sector as a provider of goods and services and the market as the 
allocative mechanism (for example, by taking industries into public 
ownership).  
 
State polices can be thought of as organised ‘horizontally’ by spatial scale and 
‘vertically’ by substantive domain. For example, vertically, there are divisions 
in terms of policies for labour and product markets, competition, merger and 
acquisition, research, technology and development, and trade. Horizontally, 
there are important distinctions between the supra-national EU, national 
states and sub-national units, linked in various ways in pursuit of economic 
development at different scales. It is, however, important to recognise that the 
national retains a key role in this new multi-scalar architecture5, not least in 
shaping the scope and extent of local and regional economic development 
strategies and modes of governance (Ache and Wood, 2000). The growing 
emphasis upon governance is symptomatic of the increasing involvement of a 
range of social actors from within civil society in the formulation and 
implementation of local and regional economic development policies. In the 
EU there is “a discernible move towards stressing the institutional agency of 
territories in enhancing their own regional economic development prospects 
and enhancing cohesion” within complex multi-level and multi-scalar systems 
of government and governance, as new scales and scalar  architectures of 
governance and regulation are created and change”6. However,  “the region is 
[not] automatically endowed with the agency to modify network positions and 
play the games of ‘scale politics’” (Lagendijk et al, 2000, 1 and 14). Moreover, 
there are marked differences in the capacities and capabilities of regions to 
exercise such agency7.  
 
                                                          
4 For a fuller discussion, see Hudson, 2001, 76-91 
5 Clearly in certain spheres, especially related to monetary policy and movements of capital, 
the regulatory capacities of national states have been markedly reduced – though even in 
these cases (not least, the Euro), this is often a result of political decisions by national states. 
More generally, however, national states remain significant sites of regulatory power within 
Europe and the ”hollowing out” metaphor denotes one aspect of a broader set of changes of 
state re-organisation. These encompass changes in the forms and modalities of national state 
involvement in more complex multi-scalar architectures of governance and regulation within 
Europe, rather than some simplistic diminution in national government’s regulatory role (for 
example, see Jessop, 1997). 
6 The growing emphasis upon regional action reflects political processes of decentralisation to 
regions to enhance their powers as political subjects and claims that the economic 
performance of firms depends upon external resources, in particular on their close interaction 
with other firms, facilitated and enhanced by spatial proximity and co-location: Hudson, 2001, 
268-81.  
7 Nonetheless, the combined effects of these intellectual and political developments has been 
focus attention upon the cultural and social resources of regions, and processes such as 
learning, that are claimed to underpin collective behaviour and economic success at the 
regional level as part of cultural and institutional turns in economic geography (for example, 
Morgan, 1995: Storper, 1995; Hudson, 2000, 92-108).   
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In summary, geographies of production systems, and the ways in which they 
change, are seen to be a result of the interaction of corporate, trades union 
and state policies, linked within complex webs of power relations. While 
structurally loaded in the favour of capital (especially multinationals) and 
states (especially powerful national states), it by no means follows that the 
determinants of a given decision as to the how, what and where of production 
within Europe (or indeed beyond it) simply follow from this as these are 
contested processes. The ways in which the causal powers of structural 
relations unfold is a contingent matter (Massey, 1995: 303-4).  In the next 
section I explore this proposition in the context of the changing political-
economic space of Europe, especially linked to the ways in which the 
successive expansions of the EU have created both threats and opportunities 
for companies and places.  
 
 
Changing economic geographies in the new Europe: some 
industrial examples 
 
Clothing: the interaction of the search for cheaper labour, product 
market changes and changing regulatory régimes  
 
Labour costs form some 60% of total production costs in clothing (Scheffer, 
1994). Consequently the clothing industry is particularly sensitive to labour 
cost variations, an emblematic example of an industry in which “weak” 
competitive strategies based on cost cutting remain pivotal and in which a 
‘spatial fix’ (Harvey, 1982, 390-393), the geographical relocation of production 
to enhance or preserve the viability of a particular socio-technical model of 
production, has repeatedly been used as a production strategy.  
 
The survival of clothing production in areas of Europe (above all, those in 
north west Europe) with high labour costs requires corporate strategies of 
‘strong’ competition, based on dimensions such as high product quality and 
design8. But such niche production is necessarily limited in terms of market 
extent and high volume production remains important and very sensitive to 
labour cost differences. The initial corporate response to increasing costs and 
labour shortages in north west Europe was to locate clothing production in 
peripheral, typically de-industrialised, regions, often with no history of the 
clothing industry and with large masses of women looking for work  - for 
example the Ruhr and north east England (Hudson, 2000, 71).  
 
The next phase of “spatial fixes” involved seeking out lower costs locations in 
other parts of Europe, both those within the EU but more particularly those 
outside the EU but tied into it economically via various trade and aid 
schemes9. In the 970s and 1980s clothing was a ‘classic’ industry in terms of 
shaping the (then) ‘new’ international division of labour (Fröbel et al, 1980). 
                                                          
8 Home-working in such areas may allow labour costs to be held down (especially when the 
workers are women from ethnic minorities, both legal and illegal migrants) but production 
organised in this way will generally be on a relatively small scale. 
9 Note that this extended south of the Mediterranean to the countries of the Maghreb (see 
Joekes, 1982). 
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There was a significant shift in clothing production from northern to parts of 
southern Europe, with a resultant growth in export-oriented inward 
investment, output and employment there, especially given the prospect of 
entry to the EU and pre-accession aid (Hudson and Lewis, 1985). For 
example, in Portugal large factories were established in the metropolitan 
areas of Lisbon and Oporto, owned by USA, European and Japanese 
companies, producing ready-to-wear garments largely for export and sale to 
European middle class consumers. With the entry of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain to the EU in the 1980s, there were enhanced levels of inward 
investment, with substantial support via EU regional policy funding (Thiel et al, 
2000).  
 
More significantly, this spatial shift provided opportunities for clothing 
producers in southern Europe to access markets in north west Europe, 
resulting in more complex geographies of clothing production and trade. This 
creation of new forms of inter-firm relations was, however, dominated by 
major western European clothing retailers. One indication of this is that two 
thirds of total EU clothing imports are directed to retailers, either as a result of 
their own actions or those of their own or contracted agents. As Scheffer 
(1994, 11) puts it, “trade in clothing and textiles appears more to be master-
minded by agents in the importing countries”. Thus key decisions about 
design, marketing and quality were taken by major retailers and/or sub-
contracting clothing manufacturers in northern Europe, as part of an emerging 
qualitative spatial division of labour within the clothing production system in 
Europe. 
 
Furthermore, such retail firms re-organised the clothing market as part of their 
competitive strategies. On the one hand, they have increasingly segmented 
the market socially and spatially; on the other hand, they have shortened 
product life cycles and blurred the established pattern of spring /summer and 
autumn/winter collections. Together, these changes have had significant 
impacts on the geography of clothing production and trade, increasing 
pressures for smaller batch and flexible production. They have further shifted 
power to the major retailers and “as a result, the interface between the 
production and commercialisation of clothing has become the pivotal point in 
the filière since from there both upstream and downstream activities can be 
controlled effectively” (Thiel et al, 2000, 111). 
 
In the 1990s, however, new possibilities for ‘spatial fixes’ began to open up 
following the political changes of 1989, which led to even lower costs labour 
locations becoming available in CEE.  Labour costs per standard minute in 
CEE were 70% of those in the UK and 33% of those in Germany (Dicken, 
1998)10. These differentials constituted a strong attraction to companies 
based elsewhere in Europe. Echoing the earlier shift to sourcing from 
southern Europe, major retail chains increasingly switched orders to CEE via 
a variety of contracting arrangements (Dunford  et al, 2001), while clothing 
production companies looked to locate there, to lower production costs. As a 
consequence, there has been significant restructuring of the clothing industry 
                                                          
10 In absolute terms, less than those in the under 0.25 DM per standard minute in CEE, 
compared to at least 0.35 DM per standard minute in the UK and 0.75 DM in Germany 
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in other European countries. Clothing producers and retailers have 
concentrated upon higher value added design, marketing, planning and 
control activity while outsourcing parts of the production process to CEE 
(Pavlínek, 1998; Begg and Pickles, 2000). This led to further plant closures 
and employment decline in both north western and also parts of southern 
Europe.   
 
As well as the closure of mass production factories and branch plants, this 
also involved the ‘hollowing out’ of formerly coherent industrial districts 
producing high-value fashion clothing, such as Herning-Ikast in Jutland 
(Denmark). Companies decentralised the most labour intensive and physically 
demanding stages of production to low labour cost areas in Poland, while 
maintaining R&D, marketing and control functions in Jutland (Dunford and 
Hudson, 1996).  As a result, between 1984 and 1994 clothing employment 
fell, often dramatically, in all of the then 12 EU Member States with the 
exception of Portugal, where there was a modest 6.5% increase.   
 
More recently, cost pressures on EU producers have further intensified, 
leading to further reductions in clothing production and employment. This has 
sharply affected ‘peripheral’ regions in north west Europe, such as north east 
England and  Northern Ireland, ironically because of close links previously 
built up between companies with production capacity there (such as Baird and 
Dewhirst) and Marks and Spencer (M&S), the UK market leader11. For a 
considerable period of time, M&S resisted the general tendency to supply 
from abroad, instead seeking to contain costs by pressuring its UK suppliers 
while maintaining quality and its reputation for clothing ‘made in Britain’.  It did 
not significantly shift to purchasing abroad until the early 1990s, seeking to 
preserve quality via using ‘preferred’ suppliers as a quality control mechanism 
(Crewe and Davenport, 1992). By the latter part of the 1990s intense 
competitive pressure in the retail clothing sector resulted in M&S desperately 
searching for cheaper non-UK suppliers, in eastern and southern Europe and 
beyond, and cutting back on the volume of orders to its remaining UK 
suppliers (see Marks and Spencer, 1999). Largely as a result of this change, 
there was a severe and rapid fall in clothing employment to 6,000 in north 
east England (compared to previous levels of over 20,000)12.  
 
In addition, however, the changing international configuration of production 
and trade also impacted upon clothing output and employment in southern 
Europe, as places that had experienced rapid growth in the 1980s were 
confronted with equally sharp decline in the 1990s. For example, by the early 
1990s employment and output were declining in Portugal, particularly 
because German retailers switched orders to CEE. Exports from Portugal to 
                                                          
11 One consequence of this is that for a time in the 1990s, in terms of employment, clothing –  
a predominantly female-employing sector –became the largest manufacturing sector in north 
east England. Many of the women subsequently losing their jobs were the sole or main 
household wage earner (Hudson, 2000, 88). 
12 Other clothing retailers, such as Hennes and Moritz have also sought to source globally, in 
search of low cost garments at the lower end of the quality spectrum. It is worth noting that 
Asia remains the main source of textile imports to the EU (WTO, 1999), with lower labour 
costs than eastern Europe, but eastern Europe offers significant advantages in terms of time 
and distance to western European markets. 
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Germany fell sharply and clothing employment in Portugal declined by almost 
25% between 1991 and 1995 (Thiel et al, 2000)13.  
 
The geography of clothing production in southern Europe has also been re-
organised in other ways, with decline in much more established areas of 
clothing production. Former industrial districts have been or are being 
‘hollowed out’, with the geographies of their production structures increasingly 
re-organised, retaining design, marketing and HQ functions while routine 
production is re-located to lower cost locations in southern and, increasingly, 
eastern Europe. As early as the beginning of the 1980s, the larger or leading 
clothing firms in Italian districts such as Carpi and Prato had initiated a far-
reaching process of de-localisation of selected labour-intensive and unskilled 
stages of production. Conversely, they increasingly concentrated upon high 
quality products and those stages of production requiring skilled labour and, 
more importantly, upon design, marketing and brand development activities 
that were less sensitive to labour costs, as well as key HQ strategic 
functions14. Similar processes of the “hollowing out” of production to 
surrounding localities with abundant cheap labour could be observed in the 
1980s in and around the town of Kastoria in northern Greece, perhaps the 
one authentic industrial district in Greece, based around the production of 
expensive clothing from imported fur (Hadjimichalis, 1998) 15. The ‘hollowing 
out’ of industrial districts is not necessarily a simple process, however, nor 
one confined to re-locating production within the national territory, as the - in 
some ways canonical - example of Benetton illustrates. Benetton emerged as 
a major clothing company as a result of a complex combination of marketing, 
organisational and process innovations. This encompassed creating a new 
global product image, a refined just-in-time production system incorporating 
both out-sourcing and a critical process innovation16, and a risk-minimising 
strategy of franchised outlets in more than one hundred countries while 
retaining key control, design and marketing functions at its base in Treviso in 
northern Italy (Crewe and Lowe, 1996). The boundaries of clothing industrial 
districts have therefore become more permeable because of the emergence 
of powerful ‘lead’ firms or gruppi, either as a result of organic growth or, more 
often, as a result of acquisition and merger activity among local firms, and the 
entry of externally-owned firms, especially larger firms that come to play 
dominant roles and shape local growth and development (Coró and 
Grandinetti, 1999; Whitford, 2001).  The net result is to create more complex 
structures of ownership and more hierarchical relationships between firms, 
establish relationships with suppliers and sub-contractors beyond the 
boundaries of the district, and fracture the former territorially bounded 
                                                          
13 It is worth noting that this aggregate decline conceals both intra-sectoral and inter-regional 
variation in the patterns of change in the Portuguese clothing industry. 
14 Hadjimichalis and Papamichos (1990) argue that such de-localisation tendencies also 
reflected growing resistance by women, children and marginalized workers to ‘super-
exploitation’ in industrial districts, in strong contrast to the dominant image of these districts as 
characterised by egalitarian, progressive industrial relations. 
15 These observations are based upon fieldwork in and around Kastoria between 1984 and 
1992. 
16  In 1972 Benetton introduced in–house dyeing at the final stage of production, crucially 
allowing piece (rather than batch) dyeing and so the dyeing of individual items to order. 
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coherence and integrity of the clothing production system within the (former) 
industrial district. 
 
At the same time as long-established industrial districts were being hollowed 
out and re-organised, new clothing clusters were emerging elsewhere. In CEE 
new clusters were evolving, incorporating new forms of inter-firm relations, 
linked into local “lead” production firms and in turn into export markets in 
western Europe (Dunford et al, 2001). Similar processes were evident in parts 
of southern Europe, but focussing less on large-scale production for mass 
markets and more upon specialised niche production.  For example, in 
Portugal the rural areas to the north of Oporto, such as the Ave Valley, 
clusters of clothing producers increasingly focussed upon small batch 
production and products, for which the main modality of competition is quality 
rather than price (Thiel et al, 2000). 
 
As indicated above, changing the geography of clothing production and trade 
in Europe crucially depended upon political changes, and changes in state 
policies and regulatory régimes. Some of these related to international trade 
in general such as the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), introduced in 1974 
under the aegis of GATT (Farrands, 1982), and the WTO. Others were 
specifically European in their origins and effects, notably pre-EU accession 
trade and aid policies in southern Europe, which effectively economically 
integrated Greece, Portugal and Spain into the EU prior to their political 
membership (Hudson and Lewis, 1985). Post-1989 there were parallel 
processes in CEE. Most significantly, until the mid-1990s the changing 
international division of labour in clothing within Europe was governed and 
shaped by an outward processing trade (OPT) régime. In this, western 
retailers and producers controlled the design, retailing and overall 
management of production, co-ordinated the shipping of textile materials for 
out-processing and organised the return of the finished commodity to the west 
European market. EU producers could export fabrics and re-import garments, 
with minimal trade tariffs and customs duty charged only on the value added 
in the production of the particular item of clothing (Scheffer, 1994).  OPT 
arrangements enabled western European companies to overcome import 
quotas applicable under the MFA and helped underpin their competitiveness 
in global markets. Having powerfully influenced the clothing trade between 
northern and southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, such OPT 
arrangements subsequently significantly affected clothing trade patterns 
between the EU and countries in CEE (Graziani, 1998). CEE clothing exports 
to western Europe increased by 20 per cent annually  between 1990 and 
1998, and by 1998 represented 5% of world clothing exports. Furthermore, 
EU countries imported 18 % of their total non-EU clothing imports from CEE 
countries17 (WTO, 1999). As Lemoine (1997: 4) has argued, “OPT was the 
engine of Central and East European manufacturing exports in the early 
nineties”. Although there has recently been a move away from OPT regulated 
trade, as tariff barriers to clothing trade are removed as part of WTO 
agreements to promote free trade, OPT-type relations nevertheless seem to 
                                                          
17 This placed CEE second only after Asia as a source of clothing imports. 
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continue despite these changes18. This reflects lock-in within networks linking 
low-cost producers in CEE and buyers in the EU, who are attempting to 
appropriate a greater share of surplus-value than would be possible if 
production was located in high cost locations 
 
In summary, the combined result of these varied processes is that particular 
core economic sites and regions in western Europe (headquarters of the 
major clothing retailers and buyers) control the “geographical transfer of 
value” (Hadjimichalis, 1987) in this production systemr. Producers in different 
European regions have varying ability to capture and appropriate value from 
continent-wide production and contracting networks.  Many peripheral regions 
in higher cost countries have seen their position in the production system 
challenged by emergent and distanciated contract networks organised on a 
continent-wide basis. Conversely, these same contractual arrangements have 
offered opportunities for new production structures, sometimes on a 
regionalised basis, to be constructed in parts of the eastern and southern 
peripheries. Clearly there is no simple or deterministic correlation between the 
changing scalar geography of clothing production and changes in 
organisational form and in relations between companies in the clothing 
production system. Such relations remain contingent and context-specific. 
 
 
Automobile production: the interaction between a search of 
labour markets to allow the introduction of new production 
concepts and practices, market penetration via inward 
investment, and changing regulatory regimes 
 
In recent years there has been a considerable internationalisation of EU 
automobile production into, first, peripheral regions of northern Europe and 
southern Europe, and secondly, into CEE (Sadler and Swain, 1994; Hudson 
and Schamp, 1995; Pavlínek, 1998). This partly reflects substantial 
differences in labour costs. Of greater significance, however, are the 
possibilities radically to re-organise working practices, with consequent effects 
on productivity levels, both in areas with no prior history of automobile 
production and in former automobile production areas, above all in CEE, in 
which there is little, if any, resistance to such changes. Production is 
increasingly  ‘Europeanised’, with “an intricate network of …  flows which 
reflect both the sourcing and marketing strategies of the major automobile 
producers, national and transnational” (Dicken et al, 1995, 4).  
 
The automobile production system is seen, by some, to be organised within 
European-wide networks, which encompass a three-fold hierarchy of regions, 
qualitatively differentiated in terms of their role in the production system. R&D 
and high level and knowledge-intensive competencies are increasingly 
concentrated in the core, centred on Germany ,19 as routine production, 
                                                          
18 This is indicated in evidence from interviews with clothing firms in CEE (Dunford et al., 
2001). 
19 For example, GM established a major R&D centre at Russelsheim, with responsibility for all 
GM R&D outside the USA, employing 7,000; BMW employs more than 6,000 at its R&D 
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especially of lower value models is increasingly dispersed to the eastern and 
southern peripheries. This emergent hierarchy “is based upon the cumulative 
competencies of the actors, the density of networks of relationships and 
proximity to the seats of power where strategic decisions are take on matters 
economic, financial, scientific, technological and political, distributing other 
activities over space …” (Bordenave and Lung, 1996, 320). However, creating 
such a regionally hierarchical Europeanised automobile production system is 
complicated in at least two ways. First, there is still evidence of ‘national 
champions’ dominating in national markets (Bordenave and Lung, 1993; 
Hudson and Schamp, 1995). Secondly, supply chains are being extended 
beyond Europe (Sadler, 1999).  
 
The proximate cause  of these changes was the crisis of Fordist mass 
production in Western Europe and the collapse of the state socialist mass 
production model in Eastern Europe. While the latter was a consequence of 
geo-political change, the former resulted from the maturing internal 
contradictions of Fordist production, allied to growing competition from 
Japanese producers using just-in-time (JIT) and lean production methods. 
However, in the 1980s, Japanese producers seeking to increase their share of 
the EU market via exports were confronted by two problems. First, a strongly 
appreciating yen made exports from Japan increasingly difficult. Secondly, 
political resistance to growing imports, reflected in voluntary export control 
arrangements, limited the share of the EU market that Japanese companies 
could acquire via importing. To increase this share, and to secure a long-term 
position in the EU market, Japanese automobile companies were compelled 
to establish production facilities within the EU, either by foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in green-field sites or via acquisition, merger or joint 
ventures. In turn, however, Japanese companies establishing  production 
faced the problem of introducing their own ‘Japanese ’high volume flexible 
production (HVFP) methods in very different cultural and political settings in 
Europe. 
 
These HVFP methods are predicated upon particular ways of organising the 
labour process, originally quite novel in a European context, with demanding 
requirements in terms of recruitment, working practices, and modes of labour 
representation. These were difficult to introduce in regions with a history of 
automobile production and a strong trades union culture committed to 
defending existing working practices and wage arrangements.  Consequently, 
Japanese companies sought production sites with particular types of labour 
market and state regulatory régime and were initially attracted to the UK by 
national government policies, fixed capital investment subsidised via regional 
policy, plus regional labour markets characterised by high levels of 
unemployment and an abundance of  ‘green labour’. Following the initial 
investment in north east England by Nissan, with assembly beginning at its 
Sunderland plant in 1986 (Garrahan and Stewart, 1992), there were major 
                                                                                                                                                                      
centre at Munich, whilst both Ford in Cologne and Mercedes in Sindelfingen, near Stuttgart, 
employ more than 4,000 in their respective R&D centre (Hudson and Schamp, 1995). Renault 
established its main R&D centre at Guyancourt in St. Quentin, near Paris, while there is also 
evidence of further concentration of R&D associated with other companies in France and Italy 
(Conti and Enrietti, 1995; Savary, 1995). 
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investments by Honda at Swindon (following its strategic alliance with British 
Leyland/Rover, begun in 1979) and Toyota in Derbyshire, at Burnaston (see 
Hudson, 1995a); Nissan subsequently invested in Spain whilst other 
Japanese companies invested elsewhere in Europe (see below).  
 
As the automobile production space was re-defined as European, competition 
for major inward investment projects, both between and within national states, 
intensified. This occurred in a context of unequal power relationships between 
large, externally owned corporations, national states, regional development 
agencies, trades unions and local communities. National states seek to attract 
and encourage inward investment but within the constraints of an EU 
framework to regulate intra-EU international competition for investment while 
they also define and administer the rules through which regions within their 
country compete between themselves and with regions elsewhere. There was 
intense competition between places for these investments. For example, 
some 40 local authorities in the UK alone bid to secure the Nissan investment 
(Hudson, 1995b). Consequently, Nissan was able to extract a high price, both 
financially in terms of grant aid and also in securing local co-operation to 
ensure that a variety of “hard” and “soft” infrastructure requirements were met. 
This intense competition can on occasion create problems. For example, 
there is still uncertainty as to the inducements offered to Nissan by, amongst 
others, the now defunct Tyne and Wear Metropolitan County Council20.  
 
Establishing new automobile plants in locations previously devoid of such 
production certainly offered (and still offers) advantages to companies. 
However, it also posed challenges in terms of embedding factories in places, 
both for the companies and for political actors seeking to capture such prized 
inward investment projects. In part, this was and is a relatively straightforward 
process in so far as it relates to providing investment grants and loans and 
‘hard’ infrastructure and even in securing desired working practices and 
modes of labour representation within the factory. For example, the strong 
tradition of industrial union organisation in north east England posed little in 
the way of a problem to Nissan, and in some respects the company used it to 
its own advantage. It devised sophisticated, complex and exhaustive 
recruitment procedures designed, inter alia, to exclude trades union activists 
or people with experience of union organisation (Garrahan and Stewart, 
1992)21. Within the region, trades unions competed vigorously for the right to 
be the sole union at the new plant (Hudson, 1995a, 79-85). The ‘winner’ of the 
contest was the AEEU. Its single union deal was seen as so ineffective by 
workers that managers had to persuade workers to join the union in an 
attempt to maintain an image of partnership in a region where such imagery 
was important22.  Elsewhere Honda secured a no-union deal rather than a one 
                                                          
20 There was also controversy surrounding the actions of Derbyshire County council in 
attracting Toyota. 
21 Indeed, Nissan was actively courted by the Thatcher government as a way of showing 
companies in the UK how to re-shape labour relations and work practices. 
22 However, strong and active union organisation unexpectedly emerged amongst women 
employed by some component suppliers located adjacent to the Nissan plant. This 
emphasises the importance of acknowledging the potential for the actions of organised labour 
to shape geographies of economies and influence trajectories of local economic development 
(see Herod, 2001; Hudson, 2001).  
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union arrangement at its Swindon plant. In general, companies had little 
difficulty in securing their preferred form of labour representation in their 
factories.  
 
It was more problematic to secure provision of appropriate ’soft’ infrastructure 
and training provision on in the surrounding regions beyond the factory 
gates23. For example, Nissan’s requirements for suitably qualified labour-
power were initially met via a direct relationship with Sunderland City Training 
and Enterprise Council (TEC), with national government and EU funding. As 
Nissan expanded the labour force in the early 1990s, however, it became 
increasingly concerned as to the efficacy of these arrangements. It decided 
that a more broadly-based and quasi-autonomous organisation, externally-
funded, was required to underwrite the labour-power requirements of the 
automobile industry in the region’s component suppliers as well as Nissan 
itself, thereby minimising labour poaching between firms. The end product of 
this was the creation of the Automotive Sector Strategic Alliance (ASSA), 
established in 199724. ASSA seeks “to support the growth and 
competitiveness of the [auto] sector through the development of a skilled 
labour force, helping create job security” (cited in Pike et al, 2000, 79). In 
particular, it aims to “cascade” a “training culture” down the tiers of the supply 
chain from Nissan and both encourage and support SMEs collectively to 
invest in training. As ASSA became more established as an institution of 
regional labour market governance and regulation, Nissan was able to step 
back, confident that the new organisation would ensure that many of its 
training requirements were met, without it seeming to favour Nissan or without 
Nissan seeming to lobby for special treatment. At the same time, however, 
both Nissan’s by-now well-established presence and ASSA’s existence 
became deployed in marketing the region, seeking to create an image of the 
north east as an automotive region, and attract future investment, in 
particular, more design-oriented and knowledge-intensive projects (Hudson, 
2000, 75). 
 
The increasing presence of Japanese producers posed a growing challenge 
to established automobile producers in western Europe, both ‘national 
champions’ (such as Fiat and Renault) and USA-based multinationals with a 
long history of production in Europe (notably Ford and GM ). Their response 
was to seek out peripheral locations within Europe in which to establish new 
factories that emulated those of the Japanese producers, such as that at 
Melfi. Melfi was established by FIAT on a ‘green-field’ site in the Mezzogiorno 
to allow a completely new (to Italy) form of work organisation to be introduced, 
underpinned by substantial financial support from the Italian state (Conti and 
Enrietti, 1995). While Melfi was established to produce high volume cars at 
the lower end of the market (notably the Punto), such peripheral plants often 
                                                          
23 In Pecks’ (19960 terms in the workplace rather than the work place. 
24 ASSA’s membership comprises Nissan and over 40 suppliers within the north east, with 
Board member representation from Nissan, local authorities, TECs, further and higher 
educational organisations, the Northern Development company (subsequently absorbed into 
the new Regional Development Agency, ONE North East in 1999), and Sunderland Business 
Link.  
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had another role. Often they were to produce relatively low volumes of 
existing or new products, such as off-road vehicles and ‘people carriers’ 
(Ferrao and Vale, 1995), as companies experimented with new products and 
new ways of producing in plants that were not central to their on-going 
production strategies.  In part this was because attempts to introduce new 
HVFP methods into their existing plants initially encountered strong resistance 
from workers and trades unions. In due course, however, as lessons were 
learned from experimental plants in peripheral locations and workers began to 
accept that there seemed little choice but to accept radical changes in working 
practices if capacity and some jobs were to be preserved in existing plants, 
‘lean’ production methods became introduced into major plants in core 
locations: early examples included BMW at Regensburg, VW at Embden and 
Citroen/PSA at Rennes  (Hudson and Schamp, 1995).  
 
The opening up of CEE offered new spaces in which to re-locate high-volume 
production of low value models, produce new products in relatively small 
volumes, and  experiment with new ways of producing  and working 
(‘experimenting-with-the-future’ approaches: Grabher, 1997, 127-9) in regions 
characterised by high unemployment and the widespread availability of labour 
of varied types. A series of inward investments in automobile assembly plants 
followed, both new ‘green field’ factories (mainly in Hungary, the former GDR 
and Poland) and joint ventures or acquisitions of existing automobile 
producers. Examples of the former include VW at Mosel, and GM Opel at 
Eisenhach, both in the former GDR, GM Opel in Gliwice in south west Poland, 
while planned new factories include BMW and Porsche at Liepzig in the 
former GDR, and a joint venture by Peugeot and Toyota in a new factory at 
Kolin in the Czech Republic. Examples of ‘brown field’ investments via 
acquisition include Fiat’s acquisition of FSM, which became Fiat Poland SA, 
Daewoo-FSO in Poland, VW’s acquisition of Skoda (in the face of competition 
from Renault), Suzuki’s Hungarian joint venture at Estergom (Swain, 1996; 
1998), Daewoo’s acquisition of Ukrainian Avtozaz and Renault’s purchase of 
Dacia in Rumania25.  
 
Such investments were both path-dependent and path-forming: Nielsen et al., 
1995).  In all cases companies were able to exercise great selectivity in 
recruitment, with rigorous practices reminiscent of those used by Japanese 
companies in the UK, and hire workers for a fraction of western Europe 
wages. By introducing new ways of working and control of the labour process 
via the activities of foremen and more assertive managerial practices, 
removing the autonomy that shop floor workers had enjoyed during the state 
socialist era (Burawoy and Krotov, 1993),  ‘the frontier of control’ (Beynon, 
1973) has been re-defined in automobile assembly and component factories 
in CEE. In cases in which the equipment and means of production were 
                                                          
25  An indication of the extent to which inward investment rapidly came to dominate 
automobile production in much of CEE is that foreign-owned companies and joint ventures 
(including components production) accounted for 85% of automobile production in Hungary, 
82% in Poland and 67% in the Czech Republic (Zemplinerová, (1998, 337). The major inward 
investing companies in 1999, in rank order, were VW, Fiat, Daewoo and Renault – the 
subsequent bankruptcy of Daewoo was a sharp reminder of the dangers involved for host 
territories in CEE. 
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relatively modern (as with VW’s acquisition of Skoda) great increases in 
productivity were initially gained without major capital investment. In some 
cases, typically those associated with ‘brown field’ acquisition of existing 
automobile plants, companies recruited workers endowed with engineering 
skills and/or experience of working in the automobile industry but amenable to 
the introduction of new working practices. In other cases of new ‘green field’ 
plants, companies recruited ‘green’ labour with no previous experience of 
working in the automobile industry (as at Magyar Suzuki: see Swain, 1998).  
 
National governments in CEE have actively sought to attract FDI in the 
automobile industry, further ratcheting up the level of territorial competition for 
such investments. Fixed capital investment costs have been subsidised by 
generous national state and/or EU financial support via regional policy grants 
and loans, and often in locations with attractive exchange rates in terms of 
exports to the west (Hudson and Schamp, 1995; Pavlínek and Smith, 1998; 
Smith and Ferenčíková, 1998)26. Often new industrial areas were prepared 
specifically to attract such investment, further reducing production costs there 
for inward investors via tax allowances: for example the Polish government 
establsihed special economic zones (SEZs - although such incentives are 
illegal under the terms of the EU accession agreements).  Such subsidisation 
by national governments and/or the EU reduces the risks to companies and 
lowers sunk cost barriers to exit, for whatever reason. Within a broad EU 
regulatory framework, local and national states and organised labour have 
been active agents in ‘capturing’ mobile investments, with the aim of (re-) 
situating local economies within a Europeanised production system. Such 
actions, however, help define and enhance the territorial competition involved 
in regional and local development in contemporary Europe, as the attempt to 
‘ground’ investments in any one local economy necessarily involves pitting it 
in competition with other regions across Europe. Such territorial competition is 
further complicated by the use of national state aids to keep production 
facilities in EU Member States in the face of relocation pressures to lower cost 
regions in, inter alia, CEE.27 
 
                                                          
26 In the longer term eastern Europe offered the promise of market expansion but in the short 
– term the attractions of producing there – notably low cost labour – militated against any 
significant market growth based on rising levels of material consumption there.  
27 Examples include the UK government’s subsidies to Nissan and Rover, the Italian 
government’s subsidy of Euros 40 million to FIAT for developing a new model at Melfi, and 
the Free State of Saxony’s subsidy of Euros 100 million to VW for the Mosel and Chemnitz 
(former Trabant) works. Eastern Germany is a particularly sensitive location. Article 92(2)(c) 
of the EC Treaty authorises “aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal 
Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in 
order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by that division'” Justification of 
aid requires a cost-benefit analysis in which the site is compared with another location in the 
EU but increasingly national governments use CEE as the comparator. The political 
sensitivities associated with such national government aid, and tensions between the EU and 
national levels, were recently emphasised by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. 
Speaking at the opening of VW’s new Dresden factory, he attacked EU attempts to limit 
national states’ capabilities to offer selective assistance to secure such investments to 
depressed regions, such as those of eastern Germany, stressing that this was central to the 
national states economic responsibilities (Simonian, 2001). 
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These plants in CEE have in turn helped re-define ‘best practices’ and 
productivity norms in automobile plants in western Europe. As the fin de siècle 
approached, the principles of ‘lean’ production were incorporated in varying 
degrees, albeit in hybridised forms as these were adapted to local 
circumstances, into all major automobile assembly plants in Europe, with the 
effects cascading down supply chains to become incorporated into first tier 
suppliers and other companies located further down supply chains. 
Furthermore, as well as leading to new links between plants within companies 
across Europe in emergent Europeanised production systems (themselves 
often part of global systems), the new HVFP methods required new forms of 
relations between firms. Increasingly major assembly companies sought to 
focus upon design, R&D, marketing and final assembly, and out-source 
component production, increasingly seeking links with first tier component 
suppliers that would provide modules and sub-assemblies rather than 
individual components. This, coupled with an emphasis on JIT delivery, and 
engineering in quality from the outset, re-defined the anatomy of the 
component sector within Europe.  
 
The increasingly stringent requirements of assembly companies helped 
trigger a surge in acquisitions and mergers and product and portfolio swaps 
within the components sector, as first tier suppliers either emerged, merged or 
consolidated their positions around particular sections of the product market 
(Dicken et al, 1995, 17; Sadler and Amin, 1995). These changes in the 
corporate anatomy of the supply chain and the switch towards JIT production 
also led to changes in production geographies. Sometimes JIT involved 
production in one place and a re-regionalisation of production. For example, 
supplier parks were established adjacent to Nissan’s Sunderland factory,  to 
the Ford/VW joint venture to produce people carriers at Setubal in Portugal 
(Ferrao and Vale, 1995) and to the SEAT factory at Matorell, near Barcelona. 
Such examples lend support to claims about a transition from former ‘global 
outpost’ forms of branch plant investment to embedded performance plants 
(Hudson, 1995b)28.  
 
Often, however, such spatial clustering was simply a necessary response to 
inadequate transport infrastructures and logistics systems. Referring to the 
supplier park established adjacent to the Fiat plant at Melfi, Mehl (cited in 
Hudson and Schamp, 1995, 227) notes29, with a degree of irony, that  “the 
                                                          
28 Equally, well-grounded fears about dis-articulated branch plant economies and of 
dependency, external control, and profit repatriation remain. Commenting, unusually) publicly, 
in the aftermath of the collapse of Daewoo in 2000 and its subsequent impacts on the 
indebted Daewoo-FSO car plant near Warsaw, Marek Belka, Poland’s Finance Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister. stressed: “We know that this debt comes from the fact that the 
company raised the prices of its supplies and lowered the prices of goods sold abroad or to 
the Daewoo chain”. More generally he added: “if we see a company that’s increasing its 
production and sales … while regularly reporting losses, it will have to reckon with an audit” 
(cited in Reed, 2001). This suggests that the continuing existence of processes of transfer of 
value both between locations within Europe and from Europe to other places within the overall 
automobile value chain.  
29 Subsequently there have been considerable improvements in road transport links in 
particular, facilitating both extended commuting to the factory and facilitating component 
delivery from other parts of Italy, but the clustering of suppliers around the assembly plant 
remains (Interviews at Melfi with Fiat managers, July 2001). 
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aspired close spatial relationship with suppliers can be seen as a tribute to 
particular Italian circumstances: strikes in the transport sector, bad road and 
rail linkages [that] make more difficult the production-synchronous delivery 
from larger distances”. In other circumstances, co-location of suppliers and 
assemblers without the provision of a specific supplier park, represents a type 
of ‘pseudo-JIT’ to cope with the problems of poor transport and 
communications infrastructure rather than synchronous production (Hudson, 
2000, 156-8). Suppliers establish warehouses from which the assembly plants 
can be supplied ‘JIT’ from buffer stocks.  Examples of this type of pseudo-JIT 
via co-location include the GM and VW assembly plants at Eisenach and 
Mosel , respectively (Schamp, 1995).  
 
More generally, there has been investment in CEE by western European 
component producers in response to assemblers locating there. For example, 
following VW’s acquisition of Skoda, several suppliers (including ITT, Bosch, 
T&N, Rockwell-Golde, VDO and Lucas) followed it there via a series of 
acquisitions and joint ventures. These moves reflected two considerations 
(Hudson and Schamp, 1995). First, to secure access to the market for 
Skoda’s component supplies; secondly, the attractions of the combination of 
low wages, skilled labour and relatively high productivity, allied to favourable 
exchange rates. More generally, automobile producers established in core 
locations in Europe, but shifting some production to peripheral locations, 
prefer maintaining links with and sourcing from existing suppliers via the latter 
establishing new, typically ‘green field’, component plants (Hudson and 
Schamp, 1995). In addition, the need to meet ‘local content’ criteria in 
applicant countries in CEE has sometimes led to the incorporation of 
indigenous component production via joint ventures with foreign assembly 
companies. For example, Daewoo established 15 Polish-South Korean joint 
ventures in component production in Poland to ensure that it met the 
minimum target of 60% ‘local’ (EU) content (Havas, 2000, 252).  
 
Echoing the impacts of earlier rounds of Japanese investment on the supply 
chain in northern Europe, inward investments in the component sector in CEE 
have helped transform the complex web of supply networks there. However, 
the power of companies such as VW and GM-Opel has led to the emergence 
of sharp asymmetries of power within reconstituted supply chains. Some 
domestic component producers have been integrated into newly established 
supply networks, For example, many Czech firms have become ‘first tier’ 
suppliers for the new investments by VW30. More commonly, however, local 
producers incorporated into these networks generally manufacture less 
complex and lower value components, with ‘high tech’ and high value 
components imported (for example, Magyar Suzuki imports such components 
from Japan).  Furthermore, as in parts of western Europe, such as Spain, 
many other ‘local’ producers have been excluded because of component 
investment from the EU. Consequently, many well-established plants have 
been excluded from these supply networks, with important implications for 
their sustainability and for regional development, as the degree to which the 
                                                          
30 There are marked similarities between VW’s component supply policies and those 
Japanese assemblers in western Europe, which prefer to source from into existing but 
appropriately-restructured supply chains (Hudson, 1995a, 73-6). 
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newly-(re)constructed automobile production systems are ‘embedded’ in 
these regions varies sharply31. In eastern as in western Europe, there is a 
range from export-oriented branch plants that are clearly ‘global outposts’ to 
regional production systems that involve closer links between assemblers and 
their suppliers in more ‘embedded’ sophisticated ‘enclave’ economies 
(Hudson, 2002).  In the latter cases, however, exclusion from or inclusion in 
these supply networks is determined by the requirements of multi-national 
auto producers, driven by corporate interests rather than those of regional 
development. 
 
Equally, however, production systems were often constructed on a pan-
European basis (not least because EU ‘local content’ rules relate to the EU 
rather than any specific region in it), offering different possibilities for inward 
investment as a source of regional development. For example, Bosch’s 
alternator plant at Miskin, near Cardiff, is one of only two plants that supply 
the entire global market with particular types of alternator (Sadler and Amin, 
1995, 48-50), VW supplies its assembly plant in Bratislava in Slovakia with 
components from suppliers in Germany via train on a daily basis, while metal 
stamped parts are delivered from Opel’s plant in Zaragoza to that in Eisenach 
by train (Schamp, 1995). Subject to appropriate logistics arrangements, 
therefore, “deadline proximity” (Ferrao and Vale, 1995) and producing JIT 
does not necessarily require co-located production. 
 
There is, however, a further twist in the tale (and tail) to processes of 
Europeanisation. Despite over-capacity and problems of profitability, there 
has been great resistance to acquisitions and mergers between European 
producers – automobiles has often been a sector of ‘national champions’ with 
considerable resistance to cross-EU border merger and acquisition (Hudson 
and Schamp, 1995). The failure of the strategic alliance and proposed merger 
between Renault and Volvo in the early 1990s exemplified the difficulties of 
cross-national mergers in the EU (Malmberg, 1995, 186-8; Savary, 1995, 163-
7). However, in the 1990s Japanese producers became increasingly crisis-
prone because of stagnating domestic demand and slowing growth of exports. 
This led to strategic alliances and other links between Japanese and non-
Japanese producers – and the increasing dominance of the pursuit of share-
holder value rather than stakeholder interests, expressed in internal labour 
market of companies in the notion of ‘jobs for life’. One such link up of 
particular significance in Europe was the strategic alliance forged in 1999 
between Renault and Nissan. Renault took a major stake (38.6%, alter 
increased to 44.4%) in the share capital of Nissan, as part of a still-evolving 
strategic alliance intended to solve Nissan’s deeply rooted profitability crisis 
(Burt, 2001). Although in principle a strategic alliance, in practice Renault 
became the dominant partner. 
 
This link-up led to competition between the companies for investment to 
produce the new generation of Nissan Micra. Despite claims that the former 
was by some distance the most productive - in terms of vehicles per worker – 
                                                          
31 In referring to ‘embeddedness’ here, I am aware that this relates only to the character of 
linkages in the supply chain and that this is at best one dimension of the more complex 
processes of ‘embedding’. 
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plant in Europe (Hudson, 2000, 147), it is located outside the Euro-zone. This 
led, early in 2001, to a growing belief that Nissan was giving serious 
consideration to shifting future production of the Micra to a Renault plant in 
France (probably Flins, on the outskirts of Paris). This would have lead to 
significant job loss both in the factory and in component supply plants in the 
north east and elsewhere in the UK. There were both economic (in terms of 
costs) and political (in terms of demonstrating that the Renault-Nissan 
relationship created jobs in France) attractions for Nissan in switching 
production to one of Renault’s existing factories in France.  
 
In the end, Micra production remained at Sunderland, but on terms that were 
very favourable to Nissan. It acquired a £40 million grant from the UK 
government, agreement by UK suppliers to price in Euros (thereby shifting the 
risks of currency fluctuation to them) and, most significantly, agreement to 24 
hour three shift working in the Sunderland plant, dramatically reducing the 
turnover time of fixed capital invested there. Simply the threat of re-
configuring the geography of corporate production in the wake of the new 
strategic alliance secured enhanced surplus-value production at Sunderland. 
At the same time, Nissan made clear that it would enhance component 
sourcing from the Euro-zone, further intensifying the pressure on component 
suppliers producing in the UK. In short, as a result of the perceived possibility 
of shifting Micra production from Sunderland, Nissan able to extract significant 
concessions from its work-force and suppliers in the UK, with significant 
effects on the geography of the value chain.  Thus the new corporate anatomy 
of automobile production in Europe led to in-situ changes at Sunderland and 
also to changes in the supply chain – and in turn again re-defined auto 
production productivity norms within Europe, with important implications for 
the geography of the automobile production system and for regional 
development in Europe. 
 
Steel: the interaction of merger and acquisition, EU expansion and 
changing regulatory regimes in re-defining anatomy of production  
 
Even more so than automobiles, steel has been an industry of ‘national 
champions’ in western Europe. Paradoxically, it can also be seen as an 
industry of great symbolic significance in the context of the EU. The 1951 
Treaty of Paris was specifically concerned to establish a cross-national 
regulatory regime for the coal and steel industries via the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community32. While there was early pan-European 
regulation, however, this gave no encouragement to cross-national mergers. 
There were several reasons for this. Firstly, steel was seen as central to 
national armaments and defence industries. Secondly, in many national 
states, steel was a public sector/nationalised industry. Thirdly, steel was a key 
input to a range of other manufacturing industries. While there was increasing 
acquisition and merger activity within national boundaries in Europe, 
especially from the late 1970s, often involving selective product and portfolio 
                                                          
32 The life of the Treaty of Paris was 50 years, so that it expires as the EU is on the verge of 
expanding into CEE, with the restructuring of the Polish steel industry in particular presenting 
a major challenge. 
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swaps33, there was very little evidence of cross-border mergers. The most 
publicised cross-border merger –between Hoesch and Hooghoven.to form 
Estel - collapsed in 1982  – but was notable for its rarity (Hudson, 1994)34. 
 
For some three decades, steel has been an industry characterised by global 
over-capacity35, with periodic trade disputes, especially involving the USA, 
often with the EU. In this context, steel companies within western Europe 
explored various ways of combating corporate crises of profitability, including 
diversification out of steel (for example, into electronics, automobiles or 
financial services), product diversification and up-grading product quality. In 
many areas of bulk steel production, however, the response to crisis was to 
cut capacity and jobs to increase levels of capacity utilisation and thereby 
reduce unit production costs. The scale of job losses has been very severe. 
Between 1975 and 1995 employment in iron and steel in the EU fell by 65% 
from 991,000 to 326,0036. Given the historical geography of the industry, 
these job losses were highly concentrated in particular regions and cities and 
towns within them. This led to a series of often fiercely contested plant 
closures and job losses (for example, see Hudson, 2000, 201-26. Many of 
these steel producers were publicly-owned, which further politicised the 
processes of cutting capacity and jobs, especially as these cuts were 
increasingly part of rationalisation processes designed to enable state-owned 
steel companies to be privatised. For by the 1990s there were intensifying 
pressures on state finances, and privatisation was seen as one way of helping 
contain them. However, privatisation, the disciplines of the market and the 
need to demonstrate share-holder value in turn further increased financial 
pressures on steel producers in the EU.  
 
While one initial response was further acquisition and mergers within national 
boundaries – notably in Italy following the privatisation of Finsider and the 
subsequent merger and rationalisation activities of Ilva and Falck in the early 
1990s (Hudson, 1994) and in Germany as first Krupp and Hoesch merged 
and then Krupp/Hoesch merged with Thyssen in 1999 to form the (then) third 
largest steel company globally.  Such mergers were a prelude to further 
rounds of capacity and job cuts and portfolio rationalisation, but also to the 
newly-merged companies seeking to expand beyond their home national 
territories. For example, ThyssenKrupp concentrated all iron and steel 
production and most of its hot strip production at Duisburg, with consequent 
cuts in employment and capacity in Dortmund (historically the centre of 
Hoesch’s operations). In addition, however, ThyssenKrupp embarked upon a 
                                                          
33 For examples include the so-called Phoenix mergers in the UK in the 1980s and the merger 
and rationalisation activities involving Ilva and Falck in Italy in the early 1990s (Hudson, 
1994).  
34 Often merger proposals faced strong political opposition. For example, in 1990 Arbed 
(Luxembourg) and Cockerill (Belgium) were forced to abandon plans to merge their flat 
products division in the face of strong political opposition in both countries.  
35 In 1980 global over-capacity was estimated at 2000 million tonnes and by 2000 still stood at 
85 million tonnes: Ekkehard Schulz, Executive /board Chairman, ThyssenKrupp (cited in 
Betts, 2002). 
36 In two of the current eastern European applicant states, Hungary and Poland, it fell , from 
222,000 to 106,000. The data were collected by the International Labour Organisation: see 
Bolger, 1997). 
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round of acquisition and divestment activities. Between 1999 and 2001 it 
acquired business with annual sales of 3.7 billion Euro and disposed of assets 
with annual sales of 2.5 billion Euro as it sought to re-position its portfolio of 
activities within and beyond steel and within and beyond Germany. For 
example, its automotive division acquired several companies to reinforce its 
position in the manufacture of vehicle bodies, engine development and 
electrical and electronic assembly activities whilst it increasingly focussed its 
activities within iron and steel on the production of both carbon and stainless 
steel flat products for automobiles and “white goods” markets, including a 
major investment in “the world’s most advanced stainless steel mill “ in China, 
which began production in 2001 with an annual capacity of 270,000 tonnes 
(Betts, 2002).  
 
As well as pressures to internationalise beyond Europe, there were also 
increasing pressures for cross-border mergers within Europe to create 
companies that could better cope with international competition, further 
rationalise production and take advantage of the emerging single European 
market. One of the more prominent of these was the merger between British 
Steel and Hooghoven to form Corus. This was a prelude to post-merger 
rationalisation. Following earlier significant job cuts announced in 2000, in 
2001 Corus announced plans for a major rationalisation of production in the 
UK. These involved further big reductions in employment and capacity, 
especially concentrated at Llanwern in south Wales and Teesside in north 
east England. This was a direct response to changes in the volume and 
composition of demand for steel in the UK, coupled with the appreciation of 
sterling against the Euro, making export to other EU markets unprofitable. It 
seems likely that in future Corus will seek to reduce its dependence on steel 
(for example, expanding aluminium production) and, within steel, move into 
eastern Europe and continue to extend its operations beyond Europe37, with 
further reductions in capacity and employment in the UK. This is especially so 
given the merger between Usinor (France), Arbed (Luxembourg) and Aceralia 
(Spain) which will create Acelor, the third biggest steel producer globally, 
which has re-defined the corporate anatomy of steel production in Europe38.  
 
Pressures to re-define the corporate anatomy and geographies of steel 
production in Europe had been enhanced by events in 1989 and the 
subsequent attempts to rationalise technically very inefficient steel production 
in CEE, especially as Poland became a serious candidate for EU entry. 
Despite marked reductions in employment  – from 156,00 in 1975, to 140,000 
in 1989 and to 92,000 in1996 (Bolger, 1997) – labour productivity in steel 
production in Poland lagged behind that in western Europe. From within CEE, 
acquisition by western steel companies is seen as the route to transform the 
industry. Following sporadic but inconclusive discussions with western 
                                                          
37 For example, in January 2002 it announced a, alliance with Sumitomo to supply shet steel 
to the automobile sector (Hijino and Marsh, 2001) 
38 Automobile producers in the EU lobbied – unsuccessfully – against Acelor, on the grounds 
that it would be in a position to raise sheet steel prices. These concerns were dismissed by 
the EU Commission on the grounds that there was substantial over-capacity in steel and that 
the major automobile companies possessed considerable purchasing power (Guerrera, 
2001). 
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companies since the early 1990s, the Polish government became increasingly 
anxious to secure privatisation via this route, especially of the major plants of 
HiL at Nova Huta, near Kracow and Huta Katowice, as these account for 
some 66% of total production capacity. For example, as Stenning (2000, 108) 
puts it, referring to HTS, the company that operates the HiL plant: “In May 
1997, HTS was converted to a state-run joint stock company since when it 
has been actively seeking foreign investment”.  In an attempt to secure 
privatisation via acquisition by western European companies by 2001 
(Wagstyl, 1998), capacity and employment were drastically further reduced, 
while at the same time undertaking fixed capital investment to modernise 
capacity and improve productivity. For example, the HiL plant employed 
32,000 in 1989 but by 1999 this had been cut to 12,000, while investing over 
£200 million modernising the plant between 1995 and 1998. In January 2000 
plans for a further 8,000 redundancies were announced.  
 
Even so, as yet, attempts to persuade western steel companies to acquire the 
Polish plants have failed. While an Austro-Dutch consortium of Voest Alpine 
and Hooghoven agreed to acquire HTS in 1998, it subsequently (in 1999) 
stalled negotiations because of concerns over the future viability of the 
company. The merger between British Steel and Hooghoven further 
complicated the situation and the future of the HiL plant and HTS remains 
unclear. There is, however, some evidence of inward investment into CEE. 
For example, in 2000 US Steel, the largest USA steel producer, announced it 
was acquiring VSZ in Slovakia, the highest quality steel producer in CEE. This 
was described as “the most significant foreign investment in Slovakia since 
Volkswagen in 1992 “ and as US Steel’s “first significant steel making 
investment for 13 years” (Anderson and Bowe, 2000). This is indicative of a 
emerging tendency towards more globalised steel companies and of the 
linkages between strategies of Europeanisation and globalisation in steel but 
within an European steel production system further reduced in scale39.    
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I sketched out a framework for understanding the geographies 
of economic and regional change in an increasingly integrated Europe. This 
focuses upon production systems in three different industries, constituted via 
the co-evolution of corporate strategies, the policies and regulatory 
frameworks of the EU and national states, and local and regional economic 
development and regeneration strategies. This has shaped the ways in which 
their geographies of have been re-worked in and beyond the boundaries of 
the evolving new Europe, especially as a consequence of the continuing 
evolution of the EU. I have sought to explore how such organisations and 
institutions have sought to both shape and use spatial differentiation within 
                                                          
39 Documents submitted to the EU by the Polish Government in 1998 envisage total 
employment in steel in Poland falling further from 82,000 to 49,000 following EU entry, with 
these cuts concentrated on Hil and Huta Katowice (Stenning, 2000). At an OECD meeting in 
December 2001, the EU offered to make capacity cuts of 13-16 mt by 2010, from a proposed 
global capacity reduction of 97mt. It is unclear as to whether this refers to the existing EU of 
15 so that any cuts in CEE applicants would be additional to these or whether it assumes 
Polish entry (Marsh and Alden, 2001).  
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Europe in pursuit of their various interests. Geographies of production 
systems are seen as an outcome of the co-evolution of the relationships 
between these individual and collective actors and institutions. 
 
The changing economic geographies discussed above can be interpreted 
both as evidence of the declining importance of the regional scale and of the 
growing importance of that scale. The re-scaling of the European economy 
would seem to be a complex process, not amenable to easy generalisation. 
While there is evidence of a tendency towards the creation of a Europeanised 
systems of automobile, clothing and steel production, linking diverse locations 
within the continent, there are important differences in their geographies. 
Even so, as there is increasing qualitative differentiation in the technical and 
social divisions of labour within and across these systems, there is a general 
tendency for more sophisticated and higher-value added activities to locate in 
‘core’ regions, with routine production dispersed to eastern and southern 
peripheries..  
 
In this context, regional development organisations of varied stripe are 
seeking to shape these evolving production systems to favour or protect 
interest in ‘their’ territory. Some regions can certainly exert a powerful 
influence, as can some national states within Europe, in securing high value-
added and knowledge-intensive activities for ‘their’ territories. Others are in a 
much weaker and more vulnerable position, however. In terms of FDI, they 
accept what they can attract, which typically may not be their preferred 
choice. In addition, many peripheral regions in north west Europe that were a 
time the location of such routine activities increasingly are being squeezed 
from two directions. They are unable to compete with the eastern and 
southern peripheries on cost, and unable to compete for higher-value added 
activities and functions with ‘core’ regions.  
 
Regions are important political subjects in the intensifying inter-territorial 
competition within and beyond Europe. Whether this will help narrow or will 
reinforce regional inequalities in economic performance and well-being 
remains an open question, however. While there is evidence of past 
convergence in regional economic performance in the EU between the 1960s 
and 1990s, this has largely been a result of convergence in broad sectoral 
(primary/secondary/tertiary) structures, with no evidence of intra-sectoral 
convergence (Canaleta et al, 2002). While the eastward expansion of the EU 
will re-create opportunities for further inter-sectoral convergence (CEC, 2001), 
this will only be temporary as the broad structures of CEE economies 
converge with those of the existing members of the Union. Furthermore, it is 
already clear that evolving intra-sectoral and intra-industry spatial divisions of 
labour are magnifying the qualitative differences between regions in relation to 
economic performance and their positions within production systems. Such 
differences will increase as the combined effects of EU deepening and 
enlargement create greater opportunities for companies and for some regions 
successfully to “play the games of ‘scale politics’” while many more lose out in 
this competition.  
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the simultaneous co-evolution of diverse 
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tendencies in the spatial organisation of production systems, therefore, is that 
the increasingly integrated New Europe will continue to be characterised by 
new forms of combined and uneven development. As such, dramatic changes 
in economic organisation and specialisation and renewed divergence in the 
map of regional economic performance and well-being can be expected. 
Because of – rather than despite - processes of Europeanisation and 
globalisation of production systems, and multi-scalar inter-territorial 
competition, there will continue to be great diversity in national and regional 
economic organisation and performance in Europe. Understanding this 
diversity is a central task for analysts of the changing nature of the 
geographies of production systems and of regional economies in a still 
enlarging Europe. 
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